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KEYNOTE REMARKS: JUDICIAL ENGAGEMENT 
THROUGH THE LENS OF LEE OPTICAL 
Randy E. Barnett* 
It is my great pleasure to be the keynote speaker at this symposium on 
“Judicial Engagement and the Role of Judges in Enforcing the Constitu-
tion.” This is a subject of enormous importance and also enormous confu-
sion. I consider it my job to get this conference off on the right foot by de-
scribing what judicial engagement is and is not. And just so you don’t dis-
miss this as just the opinion of one idiosyncratic law professor, I am going 
to take as my role model the judicial opinion in the 1954 case of Lee Opti-
cal of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Williamson.1 This is not to be confused with the 
opinion in the 1955 case of Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc.2 
The opinion I wish to consider is that of the three-judge panel in the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, not the Supreme 
Court opinion of Justice William O. Douglas. The opinion of these three 
federal judges illustrates how judicial engagement can work in practice. But 
before I describe their approach, let me digress for a few minutes to provide 
some background so we can understand the significance of the Supreme 
Court’s reversal of their decision. 
I. THE TWO ROADS TO SCRUTINY LAND 
In my previous writings, I have described a place called “Scrutiny 
Land.”3 In Scrutiny Land, the government needs to justify to a court its re-
strictions on the liberties of the people.4 Pretty much everyone today be-
lieves in Scrutiny Land. For example, there are very few who would deny 
that, when Congress enacts a statute restricting the freedom of speech or the 
free exercise of religion, a person whose liberty is affected may seek to 
have the statute nullified by a federal court because it is unconstitutional. 
To evaluate this claim, the court needs to ascertain the objective or purpose 
of the statute, whether that purpose is a proper one, and also to assess the 
  
 * Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory, Georgetown University Law Center. This 
Essay was prepared for presentation at the symposium on “Judicial Engagement & the Role of Judges in 
Enforcing the Constitution,” held on March 22, 2012 at the George Mason University School of Law. I 
thank Matthew Nicholson for his research assistance. This Article may be copied or distributed for 
classroom use. 
 1 120 F. Supp. 128 (W.D. Okla. 1954), rev’d, 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
 2 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
 3 Randy E. Barnett, Scrutiny Land, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1479 (2008). 
 4 See id. 
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degree of fit between the means chosen and the end being sought. What 
people today disagree about is exactly when a court may employ judicial 
scrutiny to nullify a properly enacted statute. In short, they disagree about 
the proper route to Scrutiny Land. 
In describing the traditional routes to Scrutiny Land, permit me to of-
fer a short and dirty version of a long and complex story. The traditional 
road to Scrutiny Land was to assess the scope of the power being asserted 
by the legislature as well as the appropriateness of the means chosen to 
execute such a power. For example, in the 1798 case of Calder v. Bull,5 
Justice Samuel Chase opined that he could not “subscribe to the omnipo-
tence of a State Legislature, or that it is absolute and without controul; alt-
hough its authority should not be expressly restrained by the Constitution, 
or fundamental law, of the State.”6 Chase affirmed that “[t]he people of the 
United States erected their Constitutions, or forms of government, to estab-
lish justice, to promote the general welfare, to secure the blessings of liber-
ty; and to protect their persons and property from violence.”7 Therefore, 
“[t]he purposes for which men enter into society will determine the nature 
and terms of the social compact; and as they are the foundation of the legis-
lative power, they will decide what are the proper objects of it.”8 He sum-
marized this proposition as follows: “The nature, and ends of legislative 
power will limit the exercise of it.”9  
Chase’s opinion is usually characterized as founded on natural rights, 
probably because of the contrasting opinion of Justice James Iredell, who 
derided the view of those “speculative jurists [who] have held, that a legis-
lative act against natural justice must, in itself, be void.”10 But Chase based 
his approach not on the doctrine of natural rights, at least not explicitly or 
directly. Instead, his focus was on the scope of the legislative powers to 
which the people have presumably given their consent. “There are acts 
which the Federal, or State, Legislature cannot do,” he wrote, “without 
exceeding their authority.”11 Among the examples of such laws, Chase 
listed the claim of power to “take[] property from A. and give[] it to B.”12  
The reason Chase offers for why such a law was improper is revealing. 
“It is against all reason and justice,” he said, “for a people to entrust a Leg-
islature with SUCH powers; and, therefore, it cannot be presumed that they 
have done it.”13 Chase’s analysis is therefore based directly on the notion of 
presumed consent, and only indirectly and silently on natural rights. When 
  
 5 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). 
 6 Id. at 387-88 (opinion of Chase, J.). 
 7 Id. at 388. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. at 398 (opinion of Iredell, J.). 
 11 Calder, 3 U.S. at 388 (opinion of Chase, J.). 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. (emphasis added). 
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the legislature claims a power that has not expressly been granted to it by 
the people, such an unenumerated power cannot be presumed. Today, we 
call this sort of approach a “clear statement” doctrine.14 Just seven years 
after Calder, Chief Justice John Marshall adopted a very similar clear 
statement rule with respect to presumed legislative intent in the case of 
United States v. Fisher:15 “Where rights are infringed, where fundamental 
principles are overthrown, where the general system of the laws is departed 
from, the legislative intention must be expressed with irresistible clearness 
to induce a court of justice to suppose a design to effect such objects.”16 
To be sure, natural justice or natural rights lurks in the background. 
But only as a way of interpreting a claim of implied power. The “due pro-
cess of law” came to be thought to include a judicial examination of wheth-
er a particular statute was within the authority or power of a legislature to 
enact. In other words, it is part of the “process of law” that the judicial 
branch ensure that a particular statute enacted by the legislative branch was 
within its power and therefore a “law.” 
At issue here was the relevant default rule. In Justice Iredell’s opinion 
in Calder, he contended that if a government “were established, by a Con-
stitution, which imposed no limits on the legislative power, the conse-
quence would inevitably be, that whatever the legislative power chose to 
enact, would be lawfully enacted, and the judicial power could never inter-
pose to pronounce it void.”17 In other words, when the written constitution 
is silent, legislatures have unlimited power. To this, Chase responded that 
“[t]o maintain that our Federal, or State, Legislature possesses such powers, 
if they had not been expressly restrained; would, in my opinion, be a politi-
cal heresy, altogether inadmissible in our free republican governments.”18 
For Chase, the legislature only has those powers that are expressly delegat-
ed, together with those implied powers that are not fundamentally unjust or, 
as it later came to be put, exercised in a manner that is “unreasonable, arbi-
trary or discriminatory.” This choice of default rules is of greatest im-
portance when the legislature is exercising implied powers rather than those 
that were expressly delegated. In the absence of a clear statement, it asks 
would a free and rational person have consented to that? 
For 150 years, this traditional police powers jurisprudence allowed for 
judicial scrutiny of legislation to ensure that the purpose of legislation was 
genuinely to serve the public welfare, rather than any particular faction or 
  
 14 See John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 399, 
406-07 (2010) (“Beginning in the last quarter of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court has displayed 
a growing fondness for construing statutes in light of constitutionally inspired “clear statement rules,” 
which insist that Congress speak with unusual clarity when it wishes to effect a result that, although 
constitutional, would disturb a constitutionally inspired value.”). 
 15 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358 (1805). 
 16 Id. at 390. 
 17 Calder, 3 U.S. at 398 (opinion of Iredell, J.). 
 18 Id. at 388 (opinion of Chase, J.). 
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class of persons.19 Such was the method of analysis employed by the Su-
preme Court in Lochner v. New York.20 In Lochner, the Court took as given 
that states had the power to promote the health and safety of its citizens.21 
For this reason, the numerous detailed regulations of the Bakeshop Act reg-
ulating the bakery business were never under any cloud. The only question 
considered by the Court was whether the maximum hours restriction was a 
genuine health and safety regulation of liberty.22 Finding no reason to single 
out bakers for this sort of protection, the Court concluded that the law must 
have been enacted for “other motives,” namely the desire of the legislature 
to serve the partial interests of the bakers’ union who pushed for the meas-
ure and the large unionized bakery companies, at the expense of small non-
union bake shops, rather than serve the general welfare.23 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Harlan did not deny that the Court 
was entitled to engage in such scrutiny of state laws. Indeed, he granted 
“that there is a liberty of contract which cannot be violated even under the 
sanction of direct legislative enactment.”24 Instead, he quarreled with the 
burden of proof employed by the majority: “the rule is universal that a leg-
islative enactment, Federal or state, is never to be disregarded or held inva-
lid unless it be, beyond question, plainly and palpably in excess of legisla-
tive power.”25 Harlan contended that, “[i]f there be doubt as to the validity 
of the statute, that doubt must therefore be resolved in favor of its validity, 
and the courts must keep their hands off, leaving the legislature to meet the 
responsibility for unwise legislation.”26 He summarized his approach this 
way: “when the validity of a statute is questioned, the burden of proof, so to 
speak, is upon those who assert it to be unconstitutional.”27 
In contrast, in his solo dissenting opinion Justice Holmes took a mark-
edly different approach. “I think that the word liberty in the Fourteenth 
Amendment is perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a 
dominant opinion,” he wrote, “unless it can be said that a rational and fair 
man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fun-
  
 19 See generally HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF 
LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWER JURISPRUDENCE (1993) (describing the longstanding tradition of police 
powers jurisprudence). 
 20 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 21 Id. at 53 (“There are, however, certain powers, existing in the sovereignty of each State in the 
Union, somewhat vaguely termed police powers, the exact description and limitation of which have not 
been attempted by the courts. Those powers, broadly stated and without, at present, any attempt at a 
more specific limitation, relate to the safety, health, morals and general welfare . . . .”). 
 22 Id. at 52-53. 
 23 Id. at 63-65. For much more on the factual context of Lochner, see DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, 
REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM (2011). 
 24 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 68 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
2012] JUDICIAL ENGAGEMENT THROUGH THE LENS OF LEE OPTICAL 849 
damental principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our 
people and our law.”28 In other words, for Justice Holmes, in the absence of 
a traditionally grounded fundamental right, only a hypothetical rational 
basis is required. As he concluded with respect to the Bake Shop Act, “[i]t 
does not need research to show that . . . . [a] reasonable man might think it a 
proper measure on the score of health.”29 Nor does it matter that the meas-
ure is inconsistent with the regulation of other similar forms of labor. “Men 
whom I certainly could not pronounce unreasonable,” he asserted, “would 
uphold it as a first instalment [sic] of a general regulation of the hours of 
work.”30 
In 1931, it was Harlan’s position rather than Holmes’s that was adopt-
ed by a majority of the Supreme Court in the case of O’Gorman & Young, 
Inc. v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,31 in which the Court refused to strike 
down an insurance regulation because “the presumption of constitutionality 
must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for over-
throwing the statute.”32 As Justice Brandeis explained, “[i]t does not appear 
upon the face of the statute, or from any facts of which the court must take 
judicial notice, that in New Jersey evils did not exist in the business of fire 
insurance for which this statutory provision was an appropriate remedy.”33 
In short, “[t]he record is barren of any allegation of fact tending to show 
unreasonableness.”34 
But note that, under the burden of proof favored by Justice Harlan and 
adopted by Justice Brandeis, it was still permissible for a person to chal-
lenge a legislative restriction on liberty by showing that it was unreasona-
ble, arbitrary, or discriminatory. This was made abundantly clear by the 
New Deal Court in the landmark 1938 case of United States v. Carolene 
Products Co.35 Although this case is known for the most famous footnote in 
the history of the Supreme Court—the celebrated Footnote Four36—in the 
less well-studied body of the case, Justice Stone reaffirmed judicial scrutiny 
of the reasonableness of a statute was still available. “Where the existence 
of a rational basis for legislation whose constitutionality is attacked depends 
upon facts beyond the sphere of judicial notice,” he wrote, “such facts may 
properly be made the subject of judicial inquiry, and the constitutionality of 
a statute predicated upon the existence of a particular state of facts may be 
challenged by showing to the court that those facts have ceased to exist.”37  
  
 28 Id. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 29 Id. (emphasis added). 
 30 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 76. 
 31 282 U.S. 251 (1931). 
 32 Id. at 257-58. 
 33 Id. at 258. 
 34 Id. 
 35 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
 36 See id. at 152 n.4. 
 37 Id. at 153 (citation omitted). 
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Earlier in his opinion, Justice Stone was emphatic about the availabil-
ity of this type of scrutiny. 
We may assume for present purposes that no pronouncement of a legislature can forestall at-
tack upon the constitutionality of the prohibition which it enacts by applying opprobrious ep-
ithets to the prohibited act, and that a statute would deny due process which precluded the 
disproof in judicial proceedings of all facts which would show or tend to show that a statute 
depriving the suitor of life, liberty or property had a rational basis.
38
 
Of course, Footnote Four established that:  
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when leg-
islation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as 
those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be em-
braced within the Fourteenth.
39
  
But it should now be clear that this was a claim about burdens of proof. 
Absent an express prohibition, it was challengers to the rationality who bore 
the burden of showing that a law was irrational, arbitrary, or discriminatory. 
In short, according to the New Deal Supreme Court, there were not 
one, but two, routes to Scrutiny Land: challengers might present a factual 
record establishing the irrationality of the legislation; or alternatively, a 
challenger might assert the violation of an express prohibition in which case 
the burden of proof would shift to the government to establish the propriety 
of its legislation. 
It is not my purpose here to critique the constitutionality of the doc-
trine adopted by the Court in Footnote Four. As I have explained elsewhere, 
this doctrine appears to violate one of the very few express rules of con-
struction in the text of the Constitution—that of the Ninth Amendment, 
which reads: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall 
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”40 
Whether or not the Ninth Amendment warrants the judicial protection of 
unenumerated rights, it does bar any construction that would “deny or dis-
parage” the liberties of the people on the ground that “certain rights” were 
“emumerat[ed] in the Constitution.”41 Footnote Four’s preference for “ex-
press prohibitions” over other liberties does precisely this. 
But when read together with the body of Justice Stone’s opinion in 
Carolene Products, the New Deal Supreme Court only “disparaged” the 
other rights retained by the people by its differential allocation of the bur-
  
 38 Id. at 152. 
 39 Id. at 152 n.4. 
 40 U.S. CONST. amend. IX; see also RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: 
THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 224-52 (2004). 
 41 See U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
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den of proof. It did not “deny” them altogether. That feat was to be left to 
the Warren Court. 
II. HOW TRADITIONAL RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW WORKED 
We now come to Lee Optical of Oklahoma v. Williamson, the District 
Court decision in 1954, not the Supreme Court decision one year later. In 
Williamson, the district court considered a challenge to a statute that re-
stricted the activities of opticians in a several ways. First, it barred anyone 
but a “licensed optometrist or ophthalmologist, ‘To fit, adjust, adapt or to in 
any manner apply lenses, frames, prisms, or any other optical appliances to 
the face of a person . . . .’ or ‘to duplicate or attempt to duplicate or to place 
or replace into the frames, any lenses’” without a written prescription from 
an Oklahoma licensed ophthalmologist or optometrist.42 In the words of the 
Court, the “unambiguous language” of the statute “makes it unlaw-
ful . . . for either a dispensing or laboratory optician to take old lenses and 
place them in new frames and then fit the completed spectacles to the face 
of the eyeglass wearer except upon written prescription from a qualified eye 
examiner.”43 
Second, the statute made it unlawful “to solicit the sale of . . . frames, 
mountings . . . or any other optical appliances.”44 Third, it barred any “per-
son, firm, or corporation engaged in the business of retailing merchandise 
to the general public” from “rent[ing] space, sub-leas[ing] departments, or 
otherwise permit[ting] any person purporting to do eye examination or vis-
ual care to occupy space” in their retail store.45 
Lee Optical of Oklahoma was a subsidiary of a Texas company that 
owned a national chain of eyeglass retailers.46 Lee Optical was founded by 
Theodore Shanbaum.47 Born to Russian immigrants who had settled in Chi-
cago, Shanbaum graduated from the University of Chicago before earning 
his law degree from DePaul in the late 1930s.48 His entry into the eyeglass 
industry came when he visited his brother-in-law, an optometrist, at his 
home in Dallas.49 But when he went into business, he chose another optom-
etrist, Dr. Ellis Carp (one of the named plaintiffs in the suit to which Lee 
Optical most famously lends its name), to partner up with under the obliga-
  
 42 Lee Optical of Okla. v. Williamson, 120 F. Supp. 128, 135 (W.D. Okla. 1954) (alteration in 
original) (quoting the Oklahoma statute), rev’d, 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
 43 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 44 Id. at 139 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 45 Id. at 142 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 46 See Joe Simnacher, Rites Held for Theodore Shanbaum: Lee Optical Founder, 87, Was Pioneer 
in Selling Low-Cost Eyewear, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Oct. 6, 1999, at 29A. 
 47 Id.  
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
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tion of a Texas law requiring an optometrist to be employed by dispensing 
opticians.50 Shanbaum minimized his start-up costs by purchasing a used 
business sign with the name “Lee Optical”; the name “Lee” has no other 
connection to the enterprise or its participants.51  
Lee Optical did business the way LensCrafters® does today. It should 
come as no surprise that local ophthalmologists and optometrists were none 
too keen on out-of-state chain competitors advertising lower prices on 
glasses. Indeed, most of the famous economic liberty cases involved legis-
lation siding with some firms in competition with others. In Lochner, the 
statute promoted by the bakeshop union favored large union-organized bak-
eries at the expense of small ethnic, nonunion bakeshops.52 In Nebbia v. 
New York,53 the regulation raising the retail price of milk sought to protect 
big milk distributors from competition from small mom and pop retailers.54 
Carolene Products protected the powerful dairy farmer constituency from 
competition from lower-priced “filled” milk.55 
As was common practice when considering challenges to the constitu-
tionality of legislation, the case was heard by a three-judge panel, which 
here included a Circuit Court Judge, the Chief Judge of the District, and a 
District Court Judge. The panel quite consciously adhered to the post-New 
Deal allocation of the burden of proof. District Judge Wallace’s restatement 
of the New Deal Court’s law is worth quoting in its entirety: 
It is recognized, without citation of authority, that all legislative enactments are accompanied 
by a presumption of constitutionality; and, that the court must not by decision invalidate an 
enactment merely because in the court’s opinion the legislature acted unwisely. Likewise, 
where the statute touches upon the public health and welfare, the statute cannot be deemed 
unconstitutional class legislation, even though a specific class of persons or businesses is 
singled out, where the legislation in its impact is free of caprice and discrimination and is ra-
tionally related to the public good. A court only can annul legislative action where it appears 
certain that the attempted exercise of police power is arbitrary, unreasonable or discriminato-
ry.
56
 
In short, in the absence of an “express prohibition,” the court employed the 
presumption of constitutionality and proceeded to analyze whether the re-
strictions imposed on opticians were “arbitrary, unreasonable or discrimina-
tory” in light of the arguments and evidence presented at trial.57 As the court 
summarized its approach, when “the public welfare is involved, the effect 
of the statute must bear a reasonable relation to the purpose to be accom-
  
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 See BERNSTEIN, supra note 23, at 23-29. 
 53 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
 54 See generally id. 
 55 See generally United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
 56 Lee Optical, 120 F. Supp. at 132. 
 57 See id. 
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plished and must not discriminate between two similarly circumstanced 
groups, regulating one group but exempting the other.”58 
To see how this approach works in practice, let me describe how the 
court assessed the restrictions on optician’s replacing broken lenses. The 
statute made it unlawful for an optician to take old lenses and place them in 
new frames and then fit the completed glasses to the face of the eyeglass 
wearer except upon written prescription from a qualified eye examiner.59 
This served to prohibit consumers “from exchanging their frames either to 
obtain more modern designs or because the former frames are broken, 
without first visiting an ophthalmologist or optometrist.”60 As the court not-
ed, this “diverts from the optician a very substantial, as well as profitable, 
part of his business.”61 
The court began by noting that written prescriptions contain no in-
structions on how glasses are “to be fitted to the face of the wearer.”62 On 
the basis of the evidence, the court concluded that “the knowledge neces-
sary to” fit glasses to the face “can skillfully and accurately be performed 
without the professional knowledge and training essential to qualify as a 
licensed optometrist or ophthalmologist.”63 For this reason, although “the 
legislature can regulate the artisan, the merchant, or the professional where 
the regulated services embrace issues of public health and welfare, the ser-
vices under consideration [bore] no real or rational relation to the actual 
vision of the public.”64 After all, to make use of this service, a consumer 
must already have a pair of glasses, the prescription for which was obtained 
after examination by an ophthalmologist or optometrist.65 “The evidence 
establishes beyond controversy” wrote the court, “that a skilled artisan 
(such as an optician) can accurately ascertain the power of a lense, or frag-
ment thereof, without the aid of a written prescription, and can thus dupli-
cate or reproduce the original pair of spectacles without adversely affecting 
the visual ability of the eyeglass wearing public.”66 “This process requires 
no unusual professional judgment, peculiar to the licensed professions of 
ophthalmology and optometry but is strictly artisan in character.”67   
My favorite part of the opinion is the court’s discussion of the “me-
chanical device known as the lensometer,” a device that “scientifically 
  
 58 Id. at 134 (footnote omitted). 
 59 Id. at 135. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id.  
 62 Lee Optical, 120 F. Supp. at 135. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. at 136. 
 67 Id. 
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measures the power of the existing lense and reduces it to prescriptive 
terms.”68 The court found that: 
The operation of the lensometer does not rise to the need or dignity of exclusive professional 
supervision. A qualified witness demonstrated and testified that any reasonably intelligent 
person can be taught to operate the lensometer and become qualified to accurately learn the 
power of existing lenses, or fragments thereof, within several hours. As further demonstrated 
by the evidence, the opticians, as a class, have for a number of years used the lensometer in 
their trade and the optometrists and ophthalmologist use this same device when wishing to 
check the power of lenses; and, although only a minority of licensed ophthalmologists re-
quire a patient to return to the examiner’s office to check the accuracy with which the origi-
nal prescription has been filled, even in such instances the lensometer is not operated by the 
physician but by a clerk in the office.
69
 
As a result of this evidence, the court found that “[i]t is absolutely unneces-
sary to delegate to professional men the control of and responsibility for the 
just-mentioned artisan tasks, where the opticians, as a group possess ade-
quate skill to fully protect the vision of the public in accurately duplicating 
existing lenses.”70 Therefore, it held that “[a]lthough on this precise issue of 
duplication, the legislature in the instant regulation was dealing with a mat-
ter of public interest, the particular means chosen are neither reasonably 
necessary nor reasonably related to the end sought to be achieved.”71 In this 
regard:  
The legislature has been guilty of undue oppression in failing to set up qualifying standards 
for the opticians, if such standards be necessary for the public protection, and at the same 
time arbitrarily legislating many of the skilled artisans out of a long recognized trade, by del-
egating the sole control of their skills and business to a professional group, when the public 
can be completely protected without taking from the optician this valuable property 
right. . . . The means chosen by the legislature does not bear ‘‘a real and substantial relation’’ 
to the end sought, that is, better vision, inasmuch as although admittedly the professional eye 
examiners are specially trained in regard to eye examination, they possess no knowledge or 
skill superior to a qualified practicing optician insofar as the artisan tasks in view are con-
cerned, and in fact the two professional groups, as a class, are not as well qualified as opti-
cians as a class to either supervise or perform the services here regulated.
72
 
In a footnote, the court noted that the effect of this restriction “is to place 
within the exclusive control of optometrists and ophthalmologists the power 
to choose just what individual opticians will be permitted to pursue their 
calling.”73 The “ophthalmologists will pointedly refer their business to a 
limited number of channels, thus denying all other opticians the opportunity 
  
 68 Lee Optical, 120 F. Supp. at 136. 
 69 Id. at 137. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. at 137-38 (footnote omitted). 
 73 Id. at 137 n.20. 
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to follow their trade regardless how competently the remaining opticians 
are qualified.”74 
According to the court, “[t]he rule is clear that where the police power 
is ushered into play it must be exercised in an undiscriminating manner in 
relation to all persons falling within the same class or circumstance.”75 But 
here, “not only is the ‘relation to the object of the legislation’ questiona-
ble . . . but ‘all persons similarly circumstanced’ pointedly have not been 
treated alike.”76 After stressing an additional irrationality that the public is 
allowed to buy ready-to-wear reading glasses from retail establishments 
without any prescription, the court declared that “[t]he legislature must not 
blow both hot and cold! If it be desirable for the public protection that opti-
cians sell merchandise and service only upon written prescriptive authority, 
the legislature cannot at the same time permit the unsupervised sale of 
ready-to-wear (convex spherical lenses) eyeglasses.”77 Employing the same 
method of analysis, the court also concluded that the restrictions on adver-
tising and allowing eye exams by doctors on the premises were also arbi-
trary, irrational, and discriminatory.78 
The most noteworthy aspect of this analysis is that the court spends no 
time discussing the origin, scope, or fundamentality of the right at issue, 
which is simply the right to pursue a lawful occupation. Indeed, the court 
never even specifically identifies the right in question other than a passing 
reference to “a long recognized trade” and its characterization of the “skills 
and business” of the optician as a “valuable property right.”79 The issue is 
not whether this right can reasonably be regulated, but how, and an analysis 
of the right does none of the work. 
All the emphasis is upon the practical operation of the statute to see if 
its discrimination against opticians is warranted, even after adopting a pre-
sumption in the legislature’s favor. The court was simply following the 
injunction affirmed by the Supreme Court in Carolene Products: 
[N]o pronouncement of a legislature can forestall attack upon the constitutionality of the 
prohibition which it enacts by applying opprobrious epithets to the prohibited act, and that a 
statute would deny due process which precluded the disproof in judicial proceedings of all 
facts which would show or tend to show that a statute depriving the suitor of life, liberty or 
property had a rational basis.
80
 
But as we all know, the Supreme Court reversed. 
  
 74 Lee Optical, 120 F. Supp. at 137 n.20. 
 75 Id. at 138. 
 76 Id. at 138-39 (quoting F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)). 
 77 Id. at 139. 
 78 See id. at 139-42 (analysis of advertising restrictions); id. at 142-43 (analysis of on-premises 
eye exams). 
 79 See Lee Optical, 120 F. Supp. at 137. 
 80 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). 
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III. GUTTING RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW 
The Supreme Court decision in Williamson v. Lee Optical is not as 
famous as such landmark cases as Marbury,81 Dred Scott,82 Plessy,83 
Brown,84 or Roe85—cases so familiar we typically refer to them by one par-
ty’s name. But it is repeatedly relied upon by the court as the authoritative 
treatment of rational basis scrutiny of economic legislation.86 It is a fixed 
point of reference for all attorneys practicing constitutional law. While most 
academics attribute the judicial withdrawal from policing economic legisla-
tion to the New Deal Court, as the previous analysis shows, the true credit 
should go to the Warren Court and, in particular, to Justice William O. 
Douglas. 
Justice Douglas’s approach is easy to characterize. In place of the op-
portunity to present evidence showing that a particular restriction was arbi-
trary, unreasonable, or discriminatory, Justice Douglas held that legislation 
would be upheld if the court could conceive of any hypothetical reason why 
the legislature might have enacted the restriction.87  
For example, although it “appears that in many cases the optician can 
easily supply the new frames or new lenses without reference to the old 
written prescription,” the “legislature might have concluded that the fre-
quency of occasions when a prescription is necessary was sufficient to justi-
fy this regulation of the fitting of eyeglasses.”88 “Likewise, when it is neces-
sary to duplicate a lens, a written prescription may or may not be necessary. 
But the legislature might have concluded that one was needed often enough 
to require one in every case.”89 “Or the legislature may have concluded that 
eye examinations were so critical, not only for correction of vision but also 
for detection of latent ailments or diseases, that every change in frames and 
every duplication of a lens should be accompanied by a prescription from a 
medical expert.”90 Justice Douglas conceded that “the present law does not 
require a new examination of the eyes every time the frames are changed or 
  
 81 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 82 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV. 
 83 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 84 347 U.S. 438 (1954). 
 85 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 86 See, e.g., Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 2323, 2333 (2010) (“When economic 
legislation does not employ classifications subject to heightened scrutiny or impinge on fundamental 
rights, courts generally view constitutional challenges with the skepticism [that] due respect for legisla-
tive choice demands.” (footnote omitted) (citing, among others, Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 
Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1955))). 
 87 See infra notes 88-95 and accompanying text. 
 88 Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 487 (emphasis added). 
 89 Id. (emphasis added). 
 90 Id. (emphasis added). 
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the lenses duplicated. For if the old prescription is on file with the optician, 
he can go ahead and make the new fitting or duplicate the lenses.”91 But to 
this he replied in what has now become canonical words: “the law need not 
be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It 
is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be 
thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct 
it.”92  
Whereas the lower court looked to the unequal treatment of opticians 
as compared with ophthalmologists and optometrist, Justice Douglas did 
away with such scrutiny with yet more hypothetical justifications: “Evils in 
the same field may be of different dimensions and proportions, requiring 
different remedies. Or so the legislature may think.”93 Alternatively, “re-
form may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the prob-
lem which seems most acute to the legislative mind. The legislature may 
select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the oth-
ers.”94 So the differential treatment of one group as compared with another, 
a tip off that laws are rent-seeking and not serving the public interest, is to 
be disregarded. “The prohibition of the Equal Protection Clause,” wrote 
Justice Douglas, “goes no further than the invidious discrimination.”95 
In sum, whereas the New Deal Court had adopted the approach of Jus-
tice Harlan’s dissent in Lochner—employing a presumption of constitution-
ality in favor of the constitutionality of regulations that can be rebutted by 
evidence showing that the restriction on liberty was arbitrary, unreasonable, 
or discriminatory—the Warren Court enshrined the approach of Justice 
Holmes’s dissenting opinion. For all practical purposes, what had once been 
a true presumption that was rebuttable by evidence and reasoning would 
henceforth be an irrebuttable presumption, which is not truly a presumption 
at all.  
But the Warren Court was not done changing the requirements of “due 
process of law.” Ten years later, in the 1965 case Griswold v. Connecticut,96 
the Court invalidated a law banning the sale and possession of contracep-
tives.97 Writing for the Court, Justice Douglas refused to reconsider the rea-
soning of Williamson v. Lee Optical.98 Instead, he purported to stay within 
the confines of Footnote Four by finding a fundamental right of privacy in 
  
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at 487-88. 
 93 Id. at 489 (emphases added). 
 94 Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 489 (citation omitted). 
 95 Id.  
 96 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 97 Id. at 480, 485-86. 
 98 See id. at 481-82 (“[W]e are met with a wide range of questions that implicate the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Overtones of some arguments suggest that Lochner v. New 
York . . . should be our guide. But we decline that invitation as we did in [West Coast Hotel Co. v. Par-
rish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), and] Williamson v. Lee Optical Co. . . . .”). 
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the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights. To accomplish this, he was 
compelled to write one of the most ridiculed sentences in the annals of Su-
preme Court decisions: “[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have 
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give 
them life and substance.”99 To support this conclusion Justice Douglas re-
lied on other so-called Lochner-era Due Process Clause cases as Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters100 and Meyer v. Nebraska.101 And, although Justice Doug-
las avoided exclusive reliance on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, eventually the right of privacy was so grounded. 
By creating a fundamental unenumerated right of privacy akin to the 
other “express prohibitions” in the text, in essence, Justice Douglas and the 
Warren Court were widening the lane to Scrutiny Land provided by Foot-
note Four to avoid reviving the other traditional route via a police-power 
rational basis analysis. And thus was born the idea that such “personal” 
liberties as privacy were to be given heightened scrutiny while mere eco-
nomic “liberty interests” were subject to Lee Optical hypothetical rational 
basis scrutiny, which is to say no scrutiny at all. The rest, as they say, is 
history. 
CONCLUSION: BEYOND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
Thus, by this circuitous route did we end up with the modern debate 
between so-called judicial “conservatives,” who in essence cling to the four 
corners of the New Deal’s Footnote Four, and so-called judicial “activists,” 
who hew to the Warren Court’s approach of Footnote Four-Plus—with the 
plus being certain additional unenumerated rights deemed fundamental by 
the Supreme Court; or what is sometimes called “preferred freedoms.” One 
camp consists of unreconstructed New Deal jurisprudes; the other of recon-
structed New Deal jurisprudes. If, however, the New Deal represented a 
genuine revolutionary moment of constitutional change,102 rather than a 
restoration of the Constitution’s original meaning from the Lochner Court’s 
deviation,103 then neither side of today’s debates over judicial engagement 
can claim the mantle of originalism.  
  
 99 Id. at 484. 
 100 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 101 262 U.S. 390 (1923); see Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481 (citing Pierce and Meyer, among other 
cases). 
 102 See generally 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 255-420 (1998) 
(contending that the New Deal was revolutionary); BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL 
COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998) (same); GILLMAN, supra note 19 
(same). 
 103 See generally WALTON HALE HAMILTON & DOUGLASS ADAIR, THE POWER TO GOVERN: THE 
CONSTITUTION—THEN AND NOW (1937) (contending that the New Deal represented a restoration of 
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But reading the traditional Due Process analysis with post-New Deal 
eyes distorts that practice. Under the modern “fundamental rights” ap-
proach: first, one only gets to Scrutiny Land if one identifies a fundamental 
right, whether enumerated or unenumerated. Second, when a fundamental 
right is at stake, laws must be strictly scrutinized. Third, because scrutiny 
must be strict, only a small number of fundamental rights can be recognized 
lest all governmental power be undermined. Finally, it is easy to ask, just 
what makes judges competent to identify and define unenumerated funda-
mental rights, when even philosophers disagree? 
But the lower court opinion in Lee Optical makes clear that a court 
need not speculate about fundamental rights; it need only identify what 
today would be called a “liberty interest.” All the emphasis is on identifying 
the proper scope of the legislature’s power, be it an enumerated power of 
Congress or the police power of states to protect the health and safety of the 
public. To identify legislation that is not in the general interest, but serves 
to benefit some class or faction at the expense of others, a court need not 
concern itself with the precise nature of the liberty or right at issue. It need 
only examine the fit between the purported end and the means chosen to see 
if the restriction might have been pre-textual. 
Twenty years after Lee Optical, the Court would once again engage in 
“rational basis scrutiny” to ferret out an improper motive for a legislative 
discrimination. In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,104 it 
examined the rationales denying a permit for group home for the mentally 
retarded, without first finding that the mentally retarded were a specially 
protected class under the Equal Protection Clause.105 This approach drew a 
sharp reproach from Justice Marshall who thought it was in direct conflict 
with Lee Optical: “[U]nder the traditional and most minimal version of the 
rational-basis test, ‘reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to 
the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative 
mind.’”106 To this he added, the “suggestion that the traditional rational-
basis test allows this sort of searching inquiry creates precedent for this 
Court and lower courts to subject economic and commercial classifications 
to similar and searching ‘ordinary’ rational-basis review—a small and re-
grettable step back toward the days of Lochner v. New York.”107 Yet 
Cleburne is still good law. 
  
original meaning); 1-2 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE 
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1953) (same). 
 104 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
 105 Id. at 435, 442-47. 
 106 See id. at 458 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Williamson v. 
Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955)). 
 107 Id. at 459-60. 
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While I would prefer that courts adopt a “presumption of liberty” of 
the sort the Court seemed to employ in Lochner,108 Lee Optical shows the 
power of rational basis scrutiny even when Justice Harlan’s rebuttable “pre-
sumption of constitutionality” is applied. That which actually exists is pos-
sible to exist, and the lower court analysis in Lee Optical shows realistic or 
actual rational basis scrutiny about the potentially improper motivation 
behind some economic legislation is both possible and realistic. By con-
trast, the hypothetical rational basis approach of Justice Douglas and the 
Warren Court is a highly unrealistic and formalist irrebuttable presumption 
that all restrictions on liberty are really in the public interest if any possible 
rationale for the restriction can be imagined by a judge.  
The modern rational basis approach adopted by the Warren Court in 
Lee Optical represents a judicial abdication of its function to police the 
Constitution’s limits on legislative power. It accomplished this by combin-
ing its formalist irrebuttable presumption of constitutionality with a judi-
cially-invented distinction between economic and personal liberties found 
nowhere in the Constitution—a distinction that runs afoul of one of the few 
rules of construction in the Constitution itself: “The enumeration in the 
Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage 
others retained by the people.”109 The lesson of Lee Optical is that protec-
tion of these retained rights requires neither their discovery and definition, 
nor what today would be called “substantive” due process. It requires only 
the recognition that the “due process of law” includes a judicial assessment 
of whether a restriction on either personal or economic liberty is genuinely 
rationally related to an end that is within the proper scope of federal or 
state legislative powers, or whether the restriction is instead irrational, 
arbitrary, or discriminatory. In short, the protection of these rights requires 
judicial engagement. 
  
 108 See generally BARNETT, supra note 40. 
 109 U.S. CONST. amend. IX (emphasis added). 
